Another difficult passage from Rudolph Gasche's paper entitled, “The Eclipse of Difference”. Gasche is talking about Heidegger's distinction between Being and beings. He has already observed that 'if it is true that Being is nothing but the Being of beings, it is also true that, as such, it must be radically different from beings themselves, even from the universe of beings, from being in totality. Above all, Being cannot possess ontic qualifications, and chiefly among them, being in the sense of existence, presence, presence-at-hand.'
He then says:

From the foregoing it ought to be clear that the philosophical concept of difference does not account for the "between" in which one finds that things and species in their difference are already present. Consequently, the question arises: "Where does the 'between'’ come from, into which the difference is, so to speak, to be inserted?"... The difference that this "between" makes isnecessarily more fundamental than all philosophical (logical) or commonplace distinction. Since this difference is presupposed by all difference as distinctionand relation, it must be "older" than distinction and relation. To circle back,then, to the difference between Being and beings, let me note that if this difference were a distinction, it would also apply to a region in which one "finds that Being and beings in their difference are already there." Yet Being is not there in the same way as beings are. If beings are what is, Being refers to the being (in a verbal sense) of beings, to what gives being. The difference between Being and beings is the difference between Being as the horizon whose opening makes it possible for beings to appear within it, and beings as those things which appear and come to stand within that horizon itself (including the manifold relations and differences that go with them). It is a difference between dissimilars, in other words.