There is an interesting post by Don Arthur over at Club Troppo on happiness, which can be interpreted as part of this debate on the relationship between economic progress and happiness. Does economic progress lead to greater happiness?

Clive Hamilton at the Australia Institute has argued that money doesn't buy happiness. This argument basically says that the ethos of neo-liberalism places too much emphasis on money and not enough on the things that really matter. Can't buy me love etc. We may be richer in terms of household income but our quality of life has deteriorated. The debate has been joined by Andrew Norton.

There has been a tendency to run happiness and wellbeing together, and when they are distinquished in terms of interpreting wellbeing in terms of the Aristotelian idea of eudaemonism as flourishing life, this is often interpreted (eg., by Hamilton) in the terms of the true self as opposed to the false self seduced by advertisers appealing to our deepest desires. Now that is not Aristotle. Hamilton's talk about a true self and spirit is a distorted interpretation of Aristotle.

Aristotle's conception of 'happiness' (a utilitarian category) is the good life which can be interpreted as a flourishing life well lived. That is an objective conception---what is good for the organism---and not the subjective one of the utilitarians---happiness according to my individual preferences or desires.

Aristotle operates with an organic conception of human nature--as distinct from the mechanistic conception of the utilitarians---and he holds that human beings are self-organizing and so are different from watches.

The talk about essences in Aristotle refers to what makes a thing or entity what it is as distinct from some other thing. So some hold that blond hair or a penis is not a what characterises the difference between a human being and stone. It is more likely to be rationality or language use.

Aristotle was reworked by Hegel and Marx in terms of essences and appearances in that a thing can appear to be 'x' but is actually 'z' (eg.,a market society appears to a collection of free individuals acting in terms of self interest but is essentially structured by power relations) whilst holding to the objectivity of appearances. They are just as real as the power relations. Platonism (appearances are illusions) has been dumped.

Hamilton 'true self' talk is actually linking back to the classical Marxist definition of ideology as a (market) discourses that promote false ideas (or "false consciousness") in subjects about the political regimes and societies they live in. Because these ideas are believed by the subjects to be true, they assist in the reproduction of the existing status quo. To critique ideology, according to this position, it is sufficient to unearth the truth(s) the ideologies conceal from the subject's knowledge. Then, so the theory runs, subjects will become aware of the political shortcomings of their current way of life and be able and moved to better them.

Zizek has argued that the operation of ideology today is not "they do not know it, but they are doing it", as it was for Marx. It is "they know it, but they are doing it anyway". Zizek's position is that nevertheless this cynicism (about market ideology) indicates the deeper efficacy of political ideology per se. Ideologies, as political or rmarket discourses, are there to secure the voluntary consent. Zizek argues, subjects will only voluntarily agree to follow one or other such arrangement if they believe that, in doing so, they are expressing their free subjectivity, and might have done otherwise.