I'm returning to Fredric Jameson's review of Zizek's The Parallax View on the London Review of Books site. An illustrated version of the Jameson review of Zizek's text can be found at Subject Barred. It is visually interesting.

Jameson says that Zizek's insistance:

on appearance now seems to bring us around unexpectedly to the whole vexed question of postmodernism and postmodernity, which is surely nothing if it is not a wholesale repudiation of essences in the name of surface, of truth in the name of fiction, of depth (past, present or future) in the name of the Nietzschean eternally recurring here-and-now. Zizek seems to identify postmodernism with 'postmodern philosophy' and relativism (an identification he shares with other enemies of these developments, some of them antediluvian, some resistant to the reification of the label), while on the other hand he endorses the proposition of an epochal change, provided we don't call it that and provided we insist that it is still, on whatever scale, capitalism--something with which I imagine everyone will nowadays be prepared to agree. Indeed, some of his basic propositions are unthinkable except within the framework of the epochal, and of some new moment of capitalism itself; Lacan is occasionally enlisted in the theorisation of these changes, which have taken place since Freud made his major discoveries.

Jameson says that jouissance is perhaps the central or at least the most powerful category in Zizek's explanatory resources; a category capable of projecting a new theory of political and collective dynamics as much as a new way of looking at individual subjectivity.He says that to grasp the implications it is best to see jouissance as a relational concept rather than some isolated ultimately determining instance or named force.

In fact, it is the concept of the envy of jouissance that accounts for collective violence, racism, nationalism and the like, as much as for the singularities of individual investments, choices and obsessions: it offers a new way of building in the whole dimension of the Other (by now a well-worn concept which, when not merely added mechanically onto some individual psychology, evaporates into Levinassian sentimentalism). The power of this conception of envy may also be judged from the crisis into which it puts merely consensual and liberal ideals like those of Rawls or Habermas, which seem to include none of the negativity we experience in everyday life and politics. Zizek, indeed, includes powerful critiques of other current forms of bien-pensant political idealism such as multiculturalism and the rhetoric of human rights admirable liberal ideals calculated to sap the energies of any serious movement intent on radical reconstruction.