In a previous post on David Couzens Hoy's Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism To Post-Critique I mentioned this interpretation of poststructuralism:

If "critique without resistance is empty and resistance without critique is blind," then the critical  task of poststructuralist thought is to account for the possibility of resistance to political and psychic subjugation without resorting either to the master-narratives of the Enlightenment or romanticized notions of a pre-discursive self untouched by power.

...the body as the site upon which modern technologies of power inscribe themselves--technologies which, to borrow Nietzsche's language in The Genealogy of Morals, are designed to domesticate the human body to the point where it can make and hold to promises. This is most cogently articulated in his argument that Nietzsche's interest in the body as the source of resistance marks a decisive epistemological departure from the Enlightenment's identification of freedom with rational self-consciousness.

Neale says that Hoy's argument is that Nietzsche's:

interest in the body as the source of resistance marks a decisive epistemological departure from the Enlightenment's identification of freedom with rational self-consciousness. The crux of his claim, in effect, is that "in contrast to Kantians and Hegelians, who believe that freedom and autonomy require rational self-transparency,Nietzscheans think that much of what we do is conditioned by embodied social background practices that we do not and perhaps cannot bring fully to consciousness." This Nietzschean move toward a genealogy of modern cultural and social practices of embodiment must be understood, Hoy rightly suggests, if one is going to begin to think in terms of post-critique.

Merleau-Ponty's account of embodiment distinguishes between the objective body,which is the body regarded as a physiological entity, and the phenomenal body, which is not just some body, some particular physiological entity, but my (or your) body as I (or you) experience it. As the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy states:

Typically, I experience my body (tacitly) as a unified potential or capacity for doing this and that-typing this sentence, scratching that itch, etc. Moreover, this sense that I have of my own motor capacities (expressed, say, as a kind of bodily confidence) does not depend on an understanding of the physiological processes involved in performing the action in question.The distinction between the objective and phenomenal body is central to understanding the phenomenological treatment of embodiment. Embodiment is not a concept that pertains to the body grasped as a physiological entity. Rather it pertains to the phenomenal body and to the role it plays in our object-directed experiences.