'An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply been read; rather one has then to begin its interpretation, for which is required an art of interpretation.' -- Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals'
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'An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply been read; rather one has then to begin its interpretation, for which is required an art of interpretation.' -- Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals'
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a history of difference #2
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June 11, 2006
In his The Eclipse of Difference, which I have referred to previously, Rudolph Gasche says that the:
... history of philosophical thought shows that such emancipation [of difference from identity] was always only partial. What takes place from Parmenides to Hegel, and beyond, is a relative liberation in which difference, rather than being effaced in the face of identity, is shown to have its only meaningful place within identity, and to play a constitutive role in the becoming effective of identity, whose priority nonetheless remains unrivaled. But apart from the factual history of philosophy, there are essential reasons that prevent the severing of difference from identity. By abolishing the difference between difference and identity, philosophy would slip back into the nonphilosophical, in short, into a kind of empiricism, in which the power of the manifold and spurious infinity prevail, and where the difference that thinking makes --- the thought of identity ---has not yet emerged. That the bond between identity and difference is an essential bond, and is constitutive of what difference means in philosophy, becomes evident in any careful analysis of the various articulations of difference to be found in the history of philosophical thinking.
My sentiments exactly. We need to think in terms of a relationship rather than as stand alone categories. However that is my Hegelian background coming through.
Gasche goes on to say that Heidegger conducts an investigation into the very presuppositions of the philosophical concept of difference. Heidegger's elaboration of difference he says:
...is fundamental and radical. It amounts to a foregrounding of the classical concept of difference in a difference more originary, in that it conceptualizes that from which differents come into a relation of standing against one another. It is a thinking of difference on this side of the possible modes that difference as relation can assume, the relation of inversion or reversal included. This is a concept of difference that not only is philosophically more fundamental than the ones evoked hereto, but that truly makes a difference. It is a radical difference, indeed, radical in all the senses of the word: it is marked by considerable departure from the usual or traditional meaning of the term; it is basic and fundamental, growing from, or proceeding from, a root which it constitutes itself.
So Heidegger is groundbreaking on this kind of metaphysics, and the groundbreaking is significant. I'm in no postion to judge this---I do not know enough about the philosophical tradition on identity and difference. What is the the classical concept of difference? It sure ain't negation. And what I do know--the classical concept of identity (Aristotle's essence)--- I'm hazy about. So I am happy to take the paragraph on board and see where Gasche takes me on this pathway as there are enough indications that we are still working within a relational way of thinking.
Update: 10 June
Gasche then asks: What then is the difference that Heidegger calls the difference between Being and beings, the ontico-ontological difference, ontological difference, or, in his later works, simply "Dif-ference"? Well I 'm glad that he does because I've always struggled to grasp this myself. I find the distinction elusive. I reckon that I get it, then I lose it. Gasche says that:
Yet, from the beginning, Western thought has also conceived of Being only from the perspective of beings, and with respect to them alone, understanding Being, consequently, as only another, however excellent or superior, being or existent. Well we do think of 'beings' as stand alone individual things or objects (subjects, atoms, sensations) and Being is usually coded as some religious entity, is it not?
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a difference more originary, in that it conceptualizes that from which differents come into a relation of standing against one another.
So this difference of Gasche's Heidegger is that from which two entities enter oposition.
But what do "from which" and "enter (into - in Gasche's words)" add in helping us conceive of what is going on when considering a matter of difference? While it sounds primordial and Heideggerian, its seems to just be saying that difference is a kind of comparison. We can't even think of things that are beyond comparison or "radically" different (unless we're being poetic).
While Gasche's Heidegger is speaking about the concept of difference and saying that Heidegger's concept is radical, that is not the same as saying the difference between the "differents" is so radical that the differents are beyond comparison.
Thanks, I am glad to know Heidegger is out there as a resource to support the comparative study of religions.