Thought-Factory.net Philosophical Conversations Public Opinion philosophy.com Junk for code
PortElliot2.jpg
'An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply been read; rather one has then to begin its interpretation, for which is required an art of interpretation.' -- Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals'
RECENT ENTRIES
SEARCH
ARCHIVES
Weblog Links
Library
Fields
Philosophers
Writers
Connections
Magazines
E-Resources
Academics
Other
www.thought-factory.net
'An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply been read; rather one has then to begin its interpretation, for which is required an art of interpretation.' -- Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals'

Levinas: the phenomenology of the other « Previous | |Next »
May 22, 2006

I've just bought Emmnual Levinas' Totality and Infinity. It is far more phenomenological than I'd thought. In the 'Introduction' John Wild says:

According to Levinas, I find myself existing in a world of alien things and elements which are other than, but not negations of myself. The latter is a logical relationwhich brings its terms together into a neutral system in the light of which each can be understand impartiality, as we say. But the world as I originally experience it is not a logical system of this kind in which no terms takes precedence over the rest. I take precedence over the various objects I find around me, and in so far as my experience is normal, learn to manipulate and control them to my advantage, either as as the member of a group which I identify with myself or simply as myself alone. In general, these objects are at my disposal, and I am free play with them, live on them, and to enjoy them at my pleasure.

This is the French Hegel --the logical one--- and it ignores that dialectics is one of existence, not just logical relations between terms.

Wild goes on to say that the primordial experience of enjoyment has been neglected by Heidegger and other phenomenologists and that Levinas devotes many pages to describing it. He argues that the neiothe rof the egocentric attitude--thinking of other students either as extensions of the self, or as alien objects to be manipulated for the advantage of the subejct--does justice to our original experience of the other person as I encounter them in a face-to-face suituation. The analysis and description of this experience is the phenomenology of the other.

| Posted by Gary Sauer-Thompson at 11:27 PM | | Comments (6)
Comments

Comments

"This is the French Hegel- the logical one- and it ignores that dialectics is one of existence, not just logical relations between terms."

I don't understand this. Isn't Hegel's dialectic a conceptual/reflective one that yields only the possibility qua thinkability of existent beings, and doesn't "The Logic" take place in the medium of pure thought on the part of the pure self?

John,
Hegel's dialectics is both logical and real--eg. the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right.

These texts make no sense otherwise. Philosophy reflects on both forms of life and our conceptions of particular forms of life, nature and society.

The Logic is the most abstract of all the texts--it is critical examination of the categories we use in metaphysics.

"The Phenomenology" was the introduction to "the system", intended to show "natural consciousness", wherein the object is conceived as separate from the subject and knowledge is conformity to the object, the necessity of assuming the standpoint of "absolute knowledge", wherein subject and object are identical and the truth of the object is its adequacy to reason. There's no doubt that Hegel intended "absolute idealism" to license an objective realism,- "the real is the rational and the rational is the real",- just as Kant claimed that transcendental idealism is an empirical realism. But, though appeal is made to the experience embedded in practical forms of life, the whole dialectical process occurs through conceptual reflection, as "thought thinking itself". It was that abstraction from any real contingent existence in the world that formed the point of attack for both Marx and Kierkegaard.

I might add that the difficulty is that Hegel's own conception of "Anerkennung" quickly becomes sublated into a mere pretext of discursive conceptual thought, and thereby lost by him, such that the other can only be a projection of reflective thought, an identical alter-ego. That would be where Levinas enters onto the scene, following on the existential/ontological critique.

John,
even if we accept that the Phenomeology was an introduction to the system and it was a critical reflection upon cultural forms of consciousness, these were forms of consciousnes that expressed and were a part of different forms of life.

Philosophical reflections upon the real relationships in liberal modernity is much more explicit in the Philosophy of Right with its triadic structure of family civil society and state.

John,
the other in Hegel is a real other--fridges in spatio-temporal relations exist with objects defined in terms of opposities, antagonistic relationships etc The emphasis is placed on the way we think about these relationships--master slave not not the dynamic of the real relationship.