May 22, 2006
I've just bought Emmnual Levinas' Totality and Infinity. It is far more phenomenological than I'd thought. In the 'Introduction' John Wild says:
According to Levinas, I find myself existing in a world of alien things and elements which are other than, but not negations of myself. The latter is a logical relationwhich brings its terms together into a neutral system in the light of which each can be understand impartiality, as we say. But the world as I originally experience it is not a logical system of this kind in which no terms takes precedence over the rest. I take precedence over the various objects I find around me, and in so far as my experience is normal, learn to manipulate and control them to my advantage, either as as the member of a group which I identify with myself or simply as myself alone. In general, these objects are at my disposal, and I am free play with them, live on them, and to enjoy them at my pleasure.
This is the French Hegel --the logical one--- and it ignores that dialectics is one of existence, not just logical relations between terms.
Wild goes on to say that the primordial experience of enjoyment has been neglected by Heidegger and other phenomenologists and that Levinas devotes many pages to describing it. He argues that the neiothe rof the egocentric attitude--thinking of other students either as extensions of the self, or as alien objects to be manipulated for the advantage of the subejct--does justice to our original experience of the other person as I encounter them in a face-to-face suituation. The analysis and description of this experience is the phenomenology of the other.
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"This is the French Hegel- the logical one- and it ignores that dialectics is one of existence, not just logical relations between terms."
I don't understand this. Isn't Hegel's dialectic a conceptual/reflective one that yields only the possibility qua thinkability of existent beings, and doesn't "The Logic" take place in the medium of pure thought on the part of the pure self?