April 16, 2006
I have lifted this section from the first chapter of Tony Smith's The Logic of Marx's Capital, Replies to Hegelian Criticisms, (State University of New York Press, 1990.) I read the book in the mid 1990s and it gives a very clear account of the three levels of the structure of Hegel's Logic.
Smith says that within Hegel's logical realm there are three fundamental sorts of structures. The first is described with the category of being (Sein). This is a category of simple unity because the basic structure here is one of an aggregate of isolated and self-contained entities, each of which is treated as a simple unity in itself.
Hegel argues that this one-tiered ontology is quite impoverished. Each isolated entity is supposedly a complete unity in itself. But each is confronted with others "outside" it, and would not be what it is without those others. An adequate determination of an entity requires an acknowledgment of its necessary interconnection with other entities. It must be acknowledged that there are principles which underlie the different units, connecting them together. In this manner a two-tiered ontology is formed, a more complex ontological structure with two poles. The first is the pole of the different unities or beings. The second pole is that of the essence (Wesen) that subsumes those separate beings under common principles.
Although the essence pole does unite different unities under it, the dominant characteristic of this structure is the difference between the two poles. This difference can be expressed in a number of ways. The essence pole can claim a priority that reduces the realm of beings to its mere appearances. Or the essence pole, the moment of unity, could be relatively extrinsic to the beings, such that the unity tends to break down and fragment.
In the final section, the notion (Begriff), Hegel introduces categories that allow for a mediation between these two levels, a unity-in-difference in which each pole remains distinct from the other while being reconciled within a structured totality. Differences here are no longer "swallowed up" by the pole of unity, or unity is no longer unstable and constantly in danger of fragmenting, the twin dangers within essence structures. Instead different individuals retain their autonomy within a unity strong enough to maintain them. The categories on the level of Begriff thus allow us to describe a complex ontological structure characterised by a reciprocal affirmation of different individuals within a common unity. This unity is both distinct from and united with the individuals. A notion structure is characterised by a harmonious reconciliation between universal and individual.
A pretty good account eh.
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Thanks, this is really helpful, particularly as I am intending on reading through some Hegel over the summer. I grappled with Kant's work on the categories earlier in the year, and these last two posts of yours provide a nice segue into Hegel for me. (I'm always a fan of diagrams, too. I've never been quite sure why they aren't used more often in philosophy, like they are in other abstract disciplines.)