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'An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply been read; rather one has then to begin its interpretation, for which is required an art of interpretation.' -- Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals'

The structure of Hegel's Logic « Previous | |Next »
April 16, 2006

I have lifted this section from the first chapter of Tony Smith's The Logic of Marx's Capital, Replies to Hegelian Criticisms, (State University of New York Press, 1990.) I read the book in the mid 1990s and it gives a very clear account of the three levels of the structure of Hegel's Logic.

Smith says that within Hegel's logical realm there are three fundamental sorts of structures. The first is described with the category of being (Sein). This is a category of simple unity because the basic structure here is one of an aggregate of isolated and self-contained entities, each of which is treated as a simple unity in itself.

Hegel3.jpg

Hegel argues that this one-tiered ontology is quite impoverished. Each isolated entity is supposedly a complete unity in itself. But each is confronted with others "outside" it, and would not be what it is without those others. An adequate determination of an entity requires an acknowledgment of its necessary interconnection with other entities. It must be acknowledged that there are principles which underlie the different units, connecting them together. In this manner a two-tiered ontology is formed, a more complex ontological structure with two poles. The first is the pole of the different unities or beings. The second pole is that of the essence (Wesen) that subsumes those separate beings under common principles.

Hegel1.jpg

Although the essence pole does unite different unities under it, the dominant characteristic of this structure is the difference between the two poles. This difference can be expressed in a number of ways. The essence pole can claim a priority that reduces the realm of beings to its mere appearances. Or the essence pole, the moment of unity, could be relatively extrinsic to the beings, such that the unity tends to break down and fragment.

In the final section, the notion (Begriff), Hegel introduces categories that allow for a mediation between these two levels, a unity-in-difference in which each pole remains distinct from the other while being reconciled within a structured totality. Differences here are no longer "swallowed up" by the pole of unity, or unity is no longer unstable and constantly in danger of fragmenting, the twin dangers within essence structures. Instead different individuals retain their autonomy within a unity strong enough to maintain them. The categories on the level of Begriff thus allow us to describe a complex ontological structure characterised by a reciprocal affirmation of different individuals within a common unity. This unity is both distinct from and united with the individuals. A notion structure is characterised by a harmonious reconciliation between universal and individual.

Hege2.jpg

A pretty good account eh.

| Posted by Gary Sauer-Thompson at 11:54 PM | | Comments (2)
Comments

Comments

Thanks, this is really helpful, particularly as I am intending on reading through some Hegel over the summer. I grappled with Kant's work on the categories earlier in the year, and these last two posts of yours provide a nice segue into Hegel for me. (I'm always a fan of diagrams, too. I've never been quite sure why they aren't used more often in philosophy, like they are in other abstract disciplines.)

Oh. Not really; once you reach this level of abstraction, the words (being, essence, notion, even 'tier') don't have much meaning. That's the problem with this kind of diagrammatic thinking (and Nick, this is why there aren't more diagrams in (good) metaphysics): one gets carried away with the model/metaphor, without assessing the significance of the relations for real objects.

Up until the Begriff 'tier', then, this is just a typical German-academic rehash of the types of debates that had been going on since Plato and the realist/nominalist clash through the High Middle Ages--the kind of shit that excites starry-eyed postmodern types who don't know better. Once you get to the 'Begriff' stage, the language just consists of abstracts of political idealism ("different individuals retain their autonomy within a unity strong enough to maintain them")--transferred to metaphysics, this is mumbo-jumbo. "Harmonious reconciliation" just sounds like a different formulation of the pseudo-Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis cliche.

For my money, it's only when Hegel gets down to the nitty-gritty of historical-cultural analysis (Egyptian art, Greek philosophy, etc.) that he becomes interesting--nonsense, of course, but interesting nonsense.