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April 15, 2006
As we know, Hegel attempted to provide an immanent ordering of the basic categories. A category is. a principle (a universal) for unifying a manifold of some sort or other (different individuals, or particulars). A category thus articulates a structure with two poles, a pole of unity and a pole of differences. Hegel says that this sort of structure, captured in some category, can be described as a unity of identity in difference, or as a reconciliation of universal and individuals.
From this general notion of a category we can go on to derive three general types of categorial structures. In one the moment of unity is stressed, with the moment of differences implicit. In another the moment of difference is emphasised, with the moment of unity now being only implicit. In a third both unity and differences are made explicit together.
Hegel claims that there is a systematic order immanently connecting these three categorial structures. A structure of unity in which differences are merely implicit is simpler than one in which these differences are explicitly introduced; and one in which both unity and differences are explicit is yet more complex still. Similarly, the first sort of structure is the most abstract, while the other structures are successively more concrete.
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Kant's account of categories was puzzling enough; moreover, Hegel in some sense never grasped Kant's attacks on idealism--are the a priori categories features of the human mind, or of, rather, some transcendental Mind? I do think Kant is suggesting the latter usually, but it's not completely clear, tho I admit I am not a Kant scholar. Which is to say, Kant's 12 categories of the understanding may, it seems to me, at this stage be psychologically interpreted, however unappealing that is to traditionalists or theists. And with a sort of psychological or cognitive reading they may have some use; I mean most humans are not ready to deny the law of the excluded middle, or various types of modality.
Hegel's version of kantianism begins with the 3rd antimony I believe, and it's not certain either the antinomy or Hegel's reading of Kant's dialectic is so proper. I tend to think it's not, and that Hegel is responsible for a whole slew of problems which continue in marx.