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'An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply been read; rather one has then to begin its interpretation, for which is required an art of interpretation.' -- Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals'

Heidegger: the world as picture « Previous | |Next »
April 4, 2006

Technological enframing is a 'way of revealing', or mode of world-disclosure that tHeidegger argues defines the ethos, or way of being, that characterizes the modern age.

According to Heidegger in "The Age of the World Picture," essay in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (trs. William Lovitt, Harper and Row, New York, 1977) there is a specific is a relationship between technological enframing and the objectification of the real in modernity. We see the first signs of the emergence of this way of beginng the mid-seventeenth century, when the real as such was first defined as something essentially amenable to the representation of human beings.

With Descartes, Heidegger argues '[w]hat is, in its entirety, is...taken in such a way that it first is in being and onlyis in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth'. This does not mean that in modernity the world becomes 'subjective'. Far from it. Modernity, Heidegger claims, does usher in a new 'subjectivism', but also an unprecedented 'objectivism'. This subjectivism and objectivism condition one another in a reciprocal interplay.

In order to posit something as a determinate object, the modern subject of representation must first project a 'groundplan' of what is to count as an element within the governing sphere of objectivity. Precisely how a thing is understood in its objectivity will depend on the groundplan thus projected. But for there to be a subject at all, the subject of representation must also be 'set up' relative to a sphere of objectivity.

So the subject of modernity not only re-presents the world as picture----that is to say, as an objective realm set out before him, but he simultaneously 'puts himself into the picture'...puts himself into the scene, i.e., into the open sphere of that which is generally and publicly represented.

What then is the content of this picture? What is the mode of being that is disclosed?

It is a technological one; one in which the world is ceaselessly objectified, qualified, quantified, and systematized-- and reduced to the level of stock, or resource. What cannot be objectified cannot be put to use, and what cannot be put to use is useless, and thus redundant. The human being is no exception.

| Posted by Gary Sauer-Thompson at 8:22 PM | | Comments (6)
Comments

Comments

So the implication, then, of the subject putting itself into the world-picture frame, as representing its representation to itself, is that it is itself a reflex of its conception of objectivity, which it projects or is projected by, such that such a "subject" only exists through suppression of authentic being-in-the-world, as constituted throught its relation to Being? Subjectivity as self-suppressing domination?

john,
yes, we are in the picture as objects who are used as resources.

Like Foucault Heidegger argues that in technological enframing the view of human beings are a kind of manipulable resource that is essential to the technological management of society.

To put it another way, individuals in modern society are to some extent determined by technological structures pervading that society.

Well, my last blogospheric "experience" had to do with the sociologist-of-science Steve Fuller, who supported ID, and who seemed to refuse to acknowledge the substantial evidence for "Darwinian" evolution, apparently making the abstract point that, if the framework of natural selection were removed, the evidence might look somewhat different. Aside from the question of just how evidence generates/supports a scientific framework, I'm wondering about just how the two notions of objective "truth" connect up: "truth" as "representation" and "truth" as a relation to/experience of "Being". (The latter might be considered just as subjectivistic as the former.) The Wittgensteinian notion of "application", of the role of a conception in a practice, might be what's missing from the "picture". That would entail considering how our social recognitions/relations,- (naturally embedded, to make the materialist point),-are implicated in our practices and vice versa.

The QCT features some interesting analysis, but the "enframing" concept seems rather troubling. For one, H. asserts, rather like Hegel, that enframing is a mode of Dasein; and if I recall correctly enframing is characterized by danger. But enframing for Heidegger is not something humans decided upon; it is more a type of manifestation. He also raises the final cause/ teleos issue via Aristotle and seems to suggest that enframing is, if not incorrect in terms of a final cause, at least puzzling or disturbing.

There appears to be a denial of "agency" or intention which often comes up in Heidegger. Really, enframing, like many of H's concepts, has a theological if not mystical aspect which should offend secularists of all types, as well as any who still values verification to some extent. Technology doesn't really have any essence, or teleological character (and I think the reversion to Aristotle should also be objected to). The earlier sections on Techne as instrumentalism (which he then sort of rejects were a more cogent or applicable; that is to say, to accept enframing is akin to accepting Hegelian ideas of a transcendent, historical process which are hardly justifiable.

Phred,
you can read Heidegger as an anti-humanist in that one account of technology has humans using it as an instrument. Heidegger argues against this account in that technology is a mode of being that shapes our conduct and the way we understand ourselves.

I don't have difficulty with that myself--does not the deregulated market do something similar?

I have a problem with H's insistence that enframing is a type of impersonal if not transcendent force. Science and Technik did not sort of just appear; they required centuries of work and experiments; and the hydro. plant H. mentions in QCT did not simply manifest itself (he nearly seems to suggest that). So yeah I still hold to science (physical science and tecknik) as instrumentalism for the most part, and a sort of "constructivist" view as well; it was created in response to needs (tho' perhaps not everyone's needs--and I am enough of a progressive (tho' a cynical one) to question that science, especially high-powered academic research, really benefits society as a whole; but my critique would be along the lines of say Feyerabend (who went from Popper to radical anti-Popper, if not anarchist views), or even Russell, who also felt that purely pragmatic and instrumental views of science (i.e., whatever works is scientific and "good") could result in science being manipulated for corrupt and/or totalitarian ends (which obviously occurs).

HOWEVER, I do admire Heidegger's reference to teleological concepts, even greatly: but he does something different than I thought he was going to do with telos. A sort of secular teleology, based on distribution, and dare I say, economic and social needs, could provide some guidelines to technological planning, instead of relying on laissez-faire econ. or bureaucrats. But no one takes that sort of vaguely Deweyan philosophical approach seriously any more.