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April 4, 2006
Robert Pierchy in The Spinoza-intoxicated man: Deleuze on expressionsays that Deleuze’s ontology is based on a tripartite distinction among Being, the virtual, and the actual is synonymous with the Event or the good repetition.
On Being he says:
Claims about Being are not to be confounded with claims about entities, whether actual (material objects) or virtual (such as Ideas). As I suggested above, Deleuze understands Being in the pronominal mode. He views it as something like expressive agency, something like movement or force. More specifically, he views it as the activity of differentiation---a destabilizing or decentring force which shatters fixed identities. One might think of this by analogy with Heraclitus’s primordial fire. In both cases, Being is seen as an incendiary force, a force which makes different and makes difference.
That's about right. Doesn't Heidegger seeks to recover a primordial sense of being that he believes has been lost
through the history of the West. Is this not one such conception?
Could we say that a Heideggerian way of thinking is implicit in Deleuze? Could we say that Deleuze appropriates Heidegger’s philosophical practice, just as Foucault did?
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