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'An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply been read; rather one has then to begin its interpretation, for which is required an art of interpretation.' -- Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals'
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'An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply been read; rather one has then to begin its interpretation, for which is required an art of interpretation.' -- Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals'

Heidegger, Nietzsche, biology « Previous | |Next »
February 20, 2006

Nietzsche has been read in vastly different and contradictory ways. He has been appropriated by both the right and the left; read as a fascist and a socialist, a conservative and a revolutionary, a religious thinker and an atheist. the post modern reading is that thesis that there is no single way of getting Nietzsche right because philosophy is an intertextual literary practice, then those with different backgrounds of texts would have different “readings” of a given text or group of texts.

Interpretations of Nietzsche continue to multiply around the biological, evolution and science. My understanding is that, despite his critique of Darwin, Nietzsche accepts the core of Darwin's theory, appropriates it for critical purposes of his own, and then builds on it in ways that continue to resonate today. Mine is a Heideggerian reading. My judgement of Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation is not a negative one, and so it is different from most contemporary American Nietzsche interpretations, which tacitly holds that Heidegger's reading is wrong , incorrect, or in error.

Here's Heidegger on the biological in Nietzsche's texts:

To be sure, Nietzsche relates everything to 'life'----to the 'biological'. Yet does he still think life itself, the biological, 'biologically', in such a way that he explains the essence of life in terms of plant and animal phenomena? Nietzsche thinks the 'biological', the essence of what is alive, in the direction of commanding and poeticizing, of the perspectival and horizonal: in the direction of freedom. He does not think the biological, that is, the essence of what is alive, biologically at all. So little is Nietzsche's thinking in danger of biologism that on the contrary he rather tends to interpret what is biological in the true and strict sense --- the plant and animal ---nonbiologically, that is, humanly, pre-eminently in terms of the determinations of perspective, horizon, commanding and poeticizing--- in general, in terms of the representing of beings. ( Nietzsche, vol. 3 . p. 122.)

This disputes the traditional interpretation of Nietzsche's biologism, racism, and eugenics, in which the biologism commits Nietzsche to some form of determinism or fatalism.

Heidegger does not simply mean biology in terms of study of living organisms ---ie., zoology--- since bios means something closer to way of life, livelihood, etc, that is organized around will to power. What we find in Nietzsche on Heidegger's reading is a systematic (metaphysical) theory of being in which becoming, change and power is ontologically basic, and in light of which we ought to understand the rest of Nietzsche's ideas.

What we have with Deleuze's interpretation is a Nietzsche as a naturalistic thinker whose philosophy of life is based on an analysis of powers as forces (ie., forces that push or set something in motion; or forces as drives or plastic dispositions to behave in ways that aim at a particular goal or values?). Yet Deleuze doesn't engage with Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche.

The non-engagement is odd isn't it. Well, I find it odd.

| Posted by Gary Sauer-Thompson at 9:44 PM | | Comments (6)
Comments

Comments

Out of curiosity, do you know any books that try and defend the Heideggarian reading against the recent readings in American philosophy?

I'm intrigued that you think the Heidegger reading is actually accurate to Heidegger's mind. I admit I'm anything but an expert on this but I always took it more as akin to his readings of other philosophers like Kant where being true to what is said was less important than being true to their questions and thinking through them "originally."

Clarke,
You write that Heidegger's:

readings of other philosophers like Kant where being true to what is said was less important than being true to their questions and thinking through them "originally."

I reckon that's pretty right. Its kinda like a pathway that Heidegger carves out in and through a text.

I guess I should say that I'm comfortable walking along the Heideggerian pathway through Nietzsche's texts; even the way that he places an emphasis on the unpublished Will to Power text. I'm more comfortable with this than with the Anglo-American interpretations.

Nope I don't know of anybook that tries to defend the Heideggarian reading against the recent readings in American philosophy--it would be an interesting book would it not?

Babich's Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science is strongly influenced by Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche and by "Heideggerian" readings (e.g. Jean Granier). Babich engages with some Anglo-American interpretations, esp. that of Maudemarie Clark (Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy). But I don't think that one could say that there's a systematic, unified "Anglo-American interpretation."

The Heideggerian reading of poor old Fritz produces a very different reading than the Deleuzean reading. Heidegger reads "the will to power" and "the eternal recurrence" as the culmination and end-point of Western subjectivism and the forgetting of being we call "metaphysics". Deleuze reads thses concepts as announcing the beginning of an ontology of becoming.

When Heidegger writes that Nietzsche does not think of "the essence of what is alive" in "biological" terms, I wonder what Heidegger knew of biology. Did Heidegger continue to think of living things in essentialist, even Aristotelian, terms? Perhaps he himself didn't appreciate what the Darwinian revolution implied. Nietzsche, for all his substantial disagreements with Darwin, at least understood that "Darwinism" rendered irrevelant all essentialism about organisms and species.

Thanks for the link. I've been meaning to pick up that book ever since I read one of her papers on it.

(BTW - in my comment it should read, " the Heidegger reading is actually accurate to *Nietzsche's* mind" But I guess you all caught that)

Regarding Heidegger and Deleuze. I confess I'm not as well versed on Deleuze as I should be. But isn't Heidegger's ultimate point that a focus on becoming is still trapped in a metaphysics of presence? I take his critique of N's eternal recurrence of the same as a way to maintain becoming in terms of presence. Does Deleuze take becoming in a sense more akin to the process thinkers like Whitehead who *may* avoid this critique of Heidegger? (I'm not entirely sure they do - but they claim they do)

H did have a background in science and apparently an abiding interest in it. Although it was more physics, as I understand, than biology.

Dr.S,
an interesting weblog you have there. I like your idea of the third Enlightenment (James, Dewey, Adorno, Foucault) that would include Nietzsche and Deleuze.

Thanks for the Babich reference. It's not been widely reviewed on the internet--I can remember searching for material on it a while back and finding very little on it. It seems to have dropped off the radar. Have you read it? What is it like?

Yeah, you are probably right: there is no systematic, unified "Anglo-American interpretation" of Nietzsche, just as there is no unifed continental reading of Nietzsche.

I meant basically a failure by the different "Anglo-American" to engage with the "Continental" readings as well as an indifference to Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche.

I concur with you that Heidegger's reading interprets Nietzsche as the culmination and end-point of Western subjectivism and the forgetting of being we call "metaphysics". That's what makes it an interesting reading.

But then the later Heidegger opens up a counter way of thinking to this technological metaphysics. How does this refer to the ontology of becoming?

Whilst I agree with your project---- significant portion of the work of Nietzsche, Adorno, Marcuse, Foucault, and Deleuze for the "pragmatist" Enlightenment I would argue for Heidegger's inclusion.

Do not the key concepts of the Enlightenment ---critique, freedom, and experience ---run through Heidegger? Does not Heidegger engage in what you consider to the central key of the Enlightenment:

the critique of institutions, practices, habits, and opinions in order to make possible a richer and more nuanced kind of freedom than that currenly on offer

Is not Heidegger concerned with freedom as experiential, insofar as it is perceived through an enriched awareness of possible ways of experiencing?

Clarke,
In chapter 12 of Giorgio Agamben's The Open: Man and Animal Agamben argues that the recently published text of Heidegger's 1929-30 winter semester lectures---published as The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude and Solitude---- relies on the then contemporary German biological and zoological studies.

The name Jakob von Uexkull is used in order to help articulate Heidegger's idea of the animal's 'poverty in the world' as the animals form of being-in-the-world. Human beings, by contrast, are world-forming. The lecture series take up and criticizes certain themes in the earlier Being and Time.

there is more on Jakob von Uexkullhere about the Umwelt of a living creature. This refers to:

...the whole which includes an individual, its behavior and objects of this behavior. The whole is composed according to the idea of autonomous activity of a living creature, i.e. its subjective character, which is carried by Bauplan (Bauplan is the carrier). It becomes objective through activity but it does not adorn a shape of an "objective" form of object but its subjective meaning (Bedeutung). Jacob von Uexkull conception according to which living creatures are subjects (i.e. do not behave according to the objective rules referring to everything but they follow their own, particular rules) implies a general change in the approach of the inquiry into living creatures.

Jakob von Uexkull is currently being recovered in terms of biosemiotics, the study of living systems from a semiotic perspective.

Hope that helps.