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November 3, 2005
In his Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze writes that:
Kant's genius, in the Critique of Pure Reason, was to conceive of an immanent critique. Critique must not be a critique of reason by feeling, by experiencing or by any kind of external instance. And what is critiqued is no longer external to reason: we should not seek, in reason, errors which have come from elsewhere--from body, senses or passions--but illusions which have come from reason as such. Kant concludes that critique must be a critique of reason by reason itself. Is this not the Kantian contradiction, making reason both the tribunal and the accused; constituting it as a judge and plaintiff, judging and judged?
Deleuze goes onto say that Kant does not realize his project of immanent critique. Traanscendental philosophy discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned. We require a genesis of reason itself, and also a genesis of the understanding and its categories: what are the forces of reason and of the understanding?
Was that not Hegel? Did not Hegel attempt a historical a genesis of reason itself, and also a genesis of the understanding and its categories?
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