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'An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been "deciphered" when it has simply been read; rather one has then to begin its interpretation, for which is required an art of interpretation.' -- Nietzsche, 'On the Genealogy of Morals'

analytic philosophy after Auschwitz « Previous | |Next »
October 18, 2005

I've could not agree more with Dylan's this account of analytic philosophy. Dylan says it very well. Much better than I could in my current flu-ridden state of being. Do go and have a read. He is grappling with a serious issue.

Analytic philosophy in Australia in the second part of the 20th century has traditionally meant scientific materialism: a naturalist, systematic philosophy aligned with natural science, based on a mechanistic metaphysics of nature and science on the path to Truth. So you would not expect it to say much about the Holocaust. Society as such did not exist. Neither did social practice. That was the extent of the reduction undertaken by Anglo-American philosophy as it worshiped at the feet of science. The reduction was so severe that this philosophy did not recognize its own Enlightenment tradition of thinking for ourselves (instead of allowing the priests to do it for us) and its conception of the progressive mastery of nature through science as historical.

Analytic philosophy did eventually develop social, ethical and political philosophies; albeit one's that turned away from the historical. They were seduced by Rawls and a social contract tradition that stripped history away and ended up a bracketing of all the events, all the traumas, of our own history.

Yet philosophy does need to think about itself in the light of Auschwitz in the form of a critical reflection against iself; against its silence and indifference to the hell of Auschwitz. Analytic philosophy sidestepped, avoided or discounted trying to make sense of Auschwitz, even though some of its philosophy courses were about the problem of evil; and even though that form of human savagery---an administrative, industrially organized murder of millions---- could not fit into the caterories of an affirmative philosophy of attaining Truth through science.

Not only were millions murdered but before their extermination their humanity was systematically eradicated while their bodies were left alive. That treatment cannot be detached from the rational method and the industrial means employed. Yet analytic philosophy remains silent. It bracketed history altogether. As Derrida observes analytic philosophers philosophize as if nothing has happened. Derrida says that:

It must be emphasized that this philosophical disinterest or indifference (I do mean philosophical, in philosophical discourse, because some individuals may as individuals be interested in the Holocaust, but they do not integrate this interest in the Holocaust into their philosophical discourse. So, it must be emphasized that disinterest) in the Holocaust often co-habits in American academic culture, probably for reasons of a bad conscience, with a prosecutorial attitude towards the least offence committed by European intellectuals, as the de Man or the Heidegger affairs have revealed.

Or we can add the prosecutorial attitude towards "postmodernism", which is seen in terms of the suppression of reason and the denial of the possibility of truth in the name of philosophy. Derrida spells the ethos of this academic culture out:
That is to say that the Americans, who were basically strangers to what happened in Europe, well, far away, American intellectuals and professors are often de-politicized, unlike many European intellectuals, they are shut up in their academic institutions, and they don't have any space for political intervention, and very often, all too often they are not interested even in the politics of their own country. They concern themselves very little with racism in the United States, with economic deprivation, with the homeless, etc, but are in big rush to set up trials concerning literary fascism in France: the de Man affair, or Blanchot, etc. And I believe this should be seen as a sign of the bad conscience of abstract, powerless intellectuals who often, how should I say it, are not too active in their own country.

And we can add Australian analytic philosophers.

The conversation continues over at Pas Au-Dela

| Posted by Gary Sauer-Thompson at 4:43 PM | | Comments (15)
Comments

Comments

That's just bullshit. Rawls as well as say Russell did more for promoting a sane, rational ethics than any postmod or marxist ever did (and like most poseurs you keep forgetting marx aligned himself with materialism and was not opposed to Darwin nor the sciences).

Rawls contracturalism is not history, but it's a realist and materialist ethics based on self-interest: and he surely was opposed to fascism and totalitarianism as a whole ( and of course this discussion conveniently overlooks Stalins' murders of millions)

And an emphasis on verification and careful language is to the advantage of history and preserving historical knowledge. Osiris help us if postmod history were to repalce the factual-based type.

And you may recall an analytical thinker, Turing (cambridge math, Wittgenstein's student, and queer) cracked the nazi radar code and did a great deal to saving Britain and the allies from bombing raids and air strikes.

And when did postmodernist become ethicists?

Now now Jason,

I'm not disputing that Rawls work was good or rational, or that it was a good man, or that Russell, Turing fought the good fight against the Nazi's. Nor am I bashing analytic philosophy.

I'm saying that the social contract tradition, and the tradition of analytic philosophy in general, bracketed history; and that this bracketing led to an indifference to the event of Auschwitz by philosophy.

Your yourself acknowledge that turn away from history. I consider this turn to be a problem because of the silence about Auschwitz by philosophy.

Why so? Why the silence?

I am not an analytical philosopher (tho people around here have tried to stamp that on me, along with "troll"); but I do value some analytical epistemology (as in Quine's Two Dogmas), and somewhat postivistic methods, more or less. I do think there was Platonic aspects to Russell (more so than the mostly nominalistic Quine or Witt.) which is perhaps a bit desperate, but I also think he was quite willing to accept materialism and historical materialism, in some fashion.
'
Russell did mention I believe and was horrified. If not then he and others deserve censure, but so do countless other academics.

Jason,
fair enough. As I said I'm not disputing that there are good aspects, positions, views re analytic philosophy; or that there are good analytic philosophers.

What I'm trying to do is understand analytic philosophy reflects upon itself within modernity as a particular tradition. It has belatedly recognized that it is a school or tradition of the 20th century, and that it is a historical form of philosophy.

So why does this school not connect/link its history to the history of the 20th century, and understand itself in relation to the history of the 20th century?

Just how does analytic philsophy understand modernity? As a continual process of enlightenment towards the truth and freedom?

I am more interested in how postmodernists sort of control blog-dialogues with their own bizarre terms and assumptions. They are not really making any "claims" (since to do would be rather analytical) but they make plenty of suggestions--such as analytical philosophers had an obligation to acknowledge the holocaust which they did not live up tp. Sounds more like traditional humanist morality than anything, and if you read say Long Sunday or Adam Clownsko's stream of idiocies you will note that beneath it all is that old college Buff and Biffy humanism, "the bastards!" Not even flavored with enough old-time Vonnegut or Pynchonian zaniness to make it amusing, or the sort of Battaile or surrealist black humor or obscenity (note that you never see like some decent obscenity or misogyny on blogs--blogland's all cleaned up, perfectly PC--no one's ever satirized or mocked except BushCo--the Enemy. The blog postmods are bogus liberals mostly, fond of cops and institutions, ready to snitch if some "troll" dares call them shit.

Those of us who were around newsgroups in the 90s, who were brought up on cyberpunk and beat lit., respected the 1st Amendment and vowed never to censor, even when some real Troll (anyone remember IceKnife of alt.slack????) was online saying he was Hitler incarnate and ready to stuff a 12 gauge in your mother's asshole. That may seem sort of juvenile or not sophisticated enough for the neo-aesthete crowd (how vul-gar!) who think Virginia Woolf was some sort of great thinker (she wasn't), but that commitment to a sort of gonzo- libertarianism was not a trivial matter.

THe PMs and their brood are a dull sort, none more so than Derrida himself. Sort of like Priests of the Non-truth

Rereading previous message I note it sort of avoids your point. I am not sure what you mean by "bracketing." Most would agree history was not the primary concern of analytical phil., though there may be some applications: if positivism is about keeping language free of metaphysics and making confirmable claims about external facts, then positivism/AP might be said to be helpful in terms of presenting and preserving an "objective" historical record. If you mean by "bracketing," that they downplayed the significance of historical events such as WWI and WWII, I would agree tentatively though I suspect the major figures--Russell certainly , Wittgenstein, Quine, Carnap etc.--had their own ideas on historical process and psychosis. What is the scientific materialist--which most AP is, with some platonic aspects perhaps--to say anyways about atrocities--the nazis were badly conditioned primates? It's either mass psychosis or what--some sort of murderous racial herd mind--or demons? Russell was reading Freud and psychology (his essay "Power") and Marx and anarchists and at least doing something to prevent the lapse into totalitarianism in Der Vaterland and Russia. I don't recall reading many essays from marxists of the 20s and 30s concerned about the rise of the Brownshirts: according to what I have read, there were Russians in support of the nazis, at least until the invasion of Poland.

My own sense is that WWII and genocide and really the last 80 years should be viewed as some sort of massive pathopsychology--Malthusian-Darwinist perhaps as much Freudo-Marxist--based on race and territoriality, and that technology offered the means to the nazis and stalinists (and USA in 'Nam) to wage war on a grand scale.

I refuse to give support to any view which upholds some historical dialectic or idealism; I detest what I have read of Foucault--both his person and writing--but his ideas on Power, on pathopsychology and on a sort of pervasive criminal and sadistic mindstate present nearly everywhere are not completely wrong--are they?

I prefer my pathopsychology from Civ. and its Discontents, or even RD Laing (and Dr. Watson and Skinner as crowd control).

Jason,
I've been on the road.
You write:

"postmodernists sort of control blog-dialogues with their own bizarre terms and assumptions. They are not really making any "claims" (since to do would be rather analytical) but they make plenty of suggestions--such as analytical philosophers had an obligation to acknowledge the holocaust which they did not live up tp. Sounds more like traditional humanist morality than anything, and if you read say Long Sunday or Adam Clownsko's stream of idiocies you will note that beneath it all is that old college Buff and Biffy humanism, "the bastards!" Not even flavored with enough old-time Vonnegut or Pynchonian zaniness to make it amusing, or the sort of Battaile or surrealist black humor or obscenity (note that you never see like some decent obscenity or misogyny on blogs--blogland's all cleaned up, perfectly PC--no one's ever satirized or mocked except BushCo--the Enemy. The blog postmods are bogus liberals mostly, fond of cops and institutions, ready to snitch if some "troll" dares call them shit."

There is plenty of material on Bataille here at philosophical conversations and the big philosophical beastie post was humerous.

Maybe postmodernism is a form of liberalism--but it does away with grand narratives and displaces the liberal conception of the human subject.

Give credit where credit is due.

Not only is PostMod more humanist moralism disguised as philosophical doctrine it is an obstacle to real political discussion. What postmods or hipsters among this little group of blogs ever addresses say transportation and the oil business? Of course they may say they are vaguely in support of "green" like policies etc. but no real discussion is offered. PMists, however left they pretend to be, are mostly cafe-aesthetes: Sartre replicants. At least Sartre engaged with some French workers of the time--though I think wrongly. No one, except for some fringe groups, maybe the Sierra Club, wants to do the real empirical research that reform will take. The obsession with theory is also another mostly bogus aspect of PM. While the free market, corp. America, and finance roar, a few deluded hipsters are chatting about what a "Truth-Event" is. The finance pages every day are a Truth-Event; billionaires are a Truth Event; the tyranny of ho-wood pop culture is a Truth Event. I don't care for all of Adorno's ideas or his use of dialectic, but at least he was willing to criticize the corrupt institutions and culture of his time.

Not only is PostMod more humanist moralism disguised as philosophical doctrine it is an obstacle to real political discussion. What postmods or hipsters among this little group of blogs ever addresses say transportation and the oil business? Of course they may say they are vaguely in support of "green" like policies etc. but no real discussion is offered. PMists, however left they pretend to be, are mostly cafe-aesthetes: Sartre replicants. At least Sartre engaged with some French workers of the time--though I think wrongly. No one, except for some fringe groups, maybe the Sierra Club, wants to do the real empirical research that reform will take. The obsession with theory is also another mostly bogus aspect of PM. While the free market, corp. America, and finance roar, a few deluded hipsters are chatting about what a "Truth-Event" is. The finance pages every day are a Truth-Event; billionaires are a Truth Event; the tyranny of ho-wood pop culture is a Truth Event. I don't care for all of Adorno's ideas or his use of dialectic, but at least he was willing to criticize the corrupt institutions and culture of his time.

Jason,
you do evade the points of the argument as your yourself note.I just get a rave against postmodernism and a reluctance to conceded very much about analytic philosophy.
As you say:

'I am not sure what you mean by "bracketing." Most would agree history was not the primary concern of analytical phil....If you mean by "bracketing," that they downplayed the significance of historical events such as WWI and WWII,I would agree tentatively..."

Doesn't that question the non-historical understanding of the postivist conception of reason? That analytic enlightening reason is an historically formed reason? Don't you think there needs to be some questioning of the presuppositions of analytic philosophy.

Jason,
you write:

"Not only is PostMod more humanist moralism disguised as philosophical doctrine it is an obstacle to real political discussion...PMists, however left they pretend to be, are mostly cafe-aesthetes.."

Who is postmod? is not poststructuralism is are most anti-humanist as I indicated above? So why not engage with a point made?

When you write "PMists...are mostly cafe-aesthetes.." who do have in midn. Foucault wrote a lot about biopolitics and the nature of power, Deleuze wrote a lot about psychoanlysis and desire and politics.
Isn't that a contrast to positivist and Quine?who did not philosophically engage with politics?

Do not what you do. You say you are of the analytic school but you do not argue. You enage in polemics against a fictional entity named 'postmod.' You say you are not an idealist.

I respect Foucault's ideas on pathopsyhology to some extent, but his writing is so full of bric a brac, and he doesn't really prove anything as far I can tell. Whatever I have gleaned from analytical phil. and the sciences has convinced me that french postmod. depends mostly on a type of conceptualism and few real points or arguments are offered. Any sort of inductive research is difficult--having completed a few linguistics projects in APA format, using segments, statistical modeling, etc. I realize how challenging it may be. Claims that various groups of people are psychotic or sadistic or deceived by consumer culture should be weighed carefully; and the Adorno-like generalizations about economics and culture seem nearly as dangerous as the conservative type. So that type of postmodernism--that the "truth" regarding various types of social phenomena may be very difficult to prove or establish, due to complexity or indeterminancy--I agree with--but that seems based on the inability of researchers to confirm various psychological or economic hypotheses (especially regarding causation/correlation), and not on some problems with language or logic.

Another points is that PoMo still upholds a sort of Rousseauian view of freedom ( as does Chomsky) which I find mostly (not entirely) indefensible. I read somewhere that Foucault had advanced determinist views at one time or another, and that is to his credit. The intention/determinism issue becomes quite overwhelming when one begins to unravel it--from a moral, psychological, and scientific standpoint--and yet it's rarely addressed by PoMo or by the analytical people, though some evolutionary psych. types are delving into it. Once one begins to broach the intention issue--which would seem to include decision theory and ethics, as well as social psych. & genetics--the limits of speculative or conceptual types of thought are quickly made apparent; there are questions about the nervous system, about the brain, about genetics which philosophy can't really do much about or provide answers to. Philosophy generally has that relation to the sciences: resolving most phil. issues requires confirmation of empirical, external facts; or, perhaps some clarification of a logical procedure or algorithm; PoMo generally doesn't address that.

Jason,
your first paragraph assumes that philosphy is the same as, or a part of, science.

isn't that what Foucault and Adorno contest, namely philosophy is different from science?

What philosophy could be is contested amongst the different strands of continental philosophy.Though the alternative is contexted there is a general rejection of the view that the philosopher, speak from perfect reflective 
equilibrium, from a disinterested view from nowhere.  

Re your second paragraph: Who do you have in mind when you say that 'Mo still upholds a sort of Rousseauian view of freedom'--Adorno, Foucault, Deleuze?

It is not clear to me that they do.

No, I would not say they are identical, though I think philosophers must decide on a given ontology: in basic terms, material, or otherwise (religious, idealist, platonic, etc) and then go from there. Like most fairly rational people I do not think there are any arguments for immaterial views. That there is some activity peculiar to philosophy, I would tentatively agree, though I think it is still predicated on a physicalism as is science. Economics is not exactly physics but is still based on a scientific worldview. The basic Humean distinction between axiomatic knowledge and facts of experience still holds, mostly (tho many assertions about facts are incapable of being confirmed); yet I would agree there is a sort of conceptualizing power (is that Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic? --I am still working with the sections on the Tran. Analytic), but I still think that is a property of the Brain, and not idealist or transcendent. A scientist examines a biological phenomena and then puts forth a theory: the facts that he looked at and his knowledge based on the facts are empirical, but there is the conceptualizing going on which is obviously not just the facts that he has examined. I think, however, that that is not some Kantian noumena but still all biochemically realized: for it would seem if there were some type of conceptual or platonic transcendence one would be able to say drink beers and not be affected, or do paranormal things, or stay awake while sleeping, etc. So the conceptualizing is derived from experiences (as I think Kant says himself); and that which is not derived from experience (theology/idealism) is speculative and doubtful. Logic and math then are types of basic space ordering--a set-ordering process I guess-- and not a means by which we contact these Platonic objects existing independent of mind; moreover, a thorough materialism begins not only with scientific materialism but with the acknowledgement that humans need to eat, have instincts, needs, desires, etc. : and from that (and Marx himself starts from that position), various politicaL and ideological systems can be (and are) derived and shaped. So in effect I think there is some similiarity between marxist materialism and that of the "Fabians"; but the marxists are always split over whether to use Hegel's dialetic as a "model" or dialectic as some sort of transcendent force. I think Marx stood by materialism and the dialectic was "model" added to the material basis, though I do not agree with his economic conclusions such as class antagonism, the surplus-labor theory of value, necessity of revolution etc.