In searching for some internet material on Whitehead, Heidegger and Deleuze I chanced upon this judgement on Heidegger by Steven Shaviro over at Pinocchio Theory. He says:

I’ve long detested Heidegger, for a number of reasons....Heidegger embodies for me, more than any other thinker in the Western tradition, what Nietzsche called the “spirit of gravity.” He’s heavy and morbid, without an ounce of humor or irony or even sense that we human beings are/have bodies. He picks up on the worst part of Nietzsche, the heavy-handed, pompous, self-obsessed, doom-laden, apocalyptic, romantic rhetoric — so stereotypically “Germanic” — of Zarathustra, but completely misses Nietzsche’s gaiety, sarcasm, “French” scepticism, and general sense of dancing over the abyss. I’ve never been able to decide which part of Heidegger is worse: the existential part, all about authenticity and resoluteness and the earth and the dwelling and being-towards-death (i.e. the Nazi side), or the ontological part, with its endless dissection of concepts by returning to their etymological roots, its walking on forest paths, its idiotic hatred of technology, its mythology of (capital-L) Language, its waiting and hearkening, its twisting of its own formulations into an endless process of self-confirmation through self-undoing (i.e. the deconstructionist side).

My first reaction is that this is is an expression of a literary cultural theorist's intense dislike for philosophy, but Shapiro kinda likes Whitehead's Process and Reality.

Shaviro says the philsophy in this text is all about change, creativity, and the production of novelty.

There are no entities in the universe according to Whitehead, but only events. Or rather, events (which he usually calls “occasions”) are themselves the only entities. These “occasions” are each of them radically new — each of them is something that never existed before — and indeed, it is only because of this perpetual creativity and novelty that we are even able to think in terms of a “before” and an “after,” of time passing and irreversible — and yet each of them is radically intertwined with, affected by and affecting in its own turn, everything else. Everything is singular, but nothing is isolated.

This is misleading because Heidegger's account of our everyday unsustainable practices ( turning the key in the door, doing the dishes, making the bed) are habitual. Instead of these habitual pratices being being the effects of consciousness directing bodily movement; they are rather the expression of an implicit kind of bodily intelligence or tacit knowledge. In these everyday situations, or those like walking the dog , one’s body knows what to do, even in the absence of a determining mental attitude. Though we can, and do, reflect on these habitual practices, they are far more bodily comportments than they are shapes of mind or consciousness.

This understanding of Heidegger's conception of our everyday habitual practices is well known. Dasein is a bodily being. It is Merleau-Ponty who is credited with drawing out the implications for our understanding of the body of Heidegger’s analysis of human being in Being and Time.

That is why I talk in terms of Shaviro's prejudices about Heidegger.