Deleuze is deeply anti-Hegelian, but interestingly so as he is concerned with ontology. Consider this passage from this text Giovanna Borradori.

He says that Hegel argues that the difference between one entity and another, what allows us to identify it, is established in contrast to what it is not. Well yes and no. An entity is also becoming for Hegel. But let us continue.

Borradori says that Deleuze argues that this difference is "external" to the entity in question or the properties that make it up because difference is unnecessarily translated into negation. In Hegel's terms, it is only via the universal that the particular becomes accessible to knowledge, the universal being the negation of the particular. Subsuming difference under negation is, thus, the major mistake Deleuze imputes to the dialectical tradition.

That sort of goes over my head. It is not clear to me why subsuming difference under negation is a major mistake.

Borradori goes on to say that it is the detour through negation that keeps the dialectical conception of difference "external" to difference itself, or difference in kind. If we want to reach difference in kind, we cannot address the entities and their properties externally, by negatively comparing them to all others, but internally, that is, by asking what are the "things themselves" rather than what they are not.

I'm not sure that I get this.

I have spent a lot of time escaping from the view that things are self-contained substances to seeing things in terms of contradictory developmental tendencies that actualize within sets of relationships. That reworking of Aristotle is how I understood Hegel. Deleuze goes on to argue that a thing:

"... is the expression of a "tendency." A tendency is a phase of becoming. Is there a correspondence between a thing and a tendency? Not a one-to-one correspondence because things are composites (des mixtes) of at least two tendencies. A tendency can express itself only insofar as it is acted upon by another tendency and, therefore, tendencies never come isolated from one another but always in pairs."

Smokewriting puts it this way:

Way back at the start of his career, he uses a Hegel - Jean Hyppolite’s Hegel - as the figure of a tendency in French philosophy that has to be overcome, namely the 'anthropologising' of difference--- i.e. understanding absolute difference as contradiction ...But it's arguably Hegelianism as a historical phenomenon that Deleuze, in his earliest work, saw as a problem---something that, in Dialogues he describes as a dead weight, embodying...everything stultifying about the French academy...What Hegelianism was, for Deleuze, was the way in which this tendency made itself felt in the 40s and 50s. Arguably it’s the Hegel of Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence that comes under attack in Difference & Repetition and Logic of Sense, just as it’s the existentialist Hegel of Wahl and Kojeve who comes under attack in Nietzsche & Philosophy.