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March 20, 2005
Chapter 11 of Heidegger's Nihilism book (vol.4 of Nietzsche) is entitled 'Subjectivity in Nietzsche's Interpretation of History'.
It starts by summarizing what Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's understanding of nihilism has involved up to now:
"The dominance of valuation thought in metaphysics signifies....that Nietzsche conceives the task of future metaphysics to be the revaluation of all values. At the same time..the dominance of evaluative thought presupposes as self evident the fact that all prior metaphysics---that is, all metaphysics that historically preceded the metaphysics of the will to power---has been, even if only tacitly, metaphysics of the will to power. Nietzsche conceives the whole of Western philosophy as a thinking in values and a reckoning in values, as value positing. Being, the beingness of beings, is interpreted as will to power."
This is what has been established so far. Nietzsche's philosophy is more than his particular view, as it is a revaluating stance towards previous metaphysics--a confrontation that examines and interprets the past in terms of its own horizons.
Heidegger says that it may be the case that this confrontation lends metaphysics the words to say what it has always wanted to say but could not. Rather than being a distortion of previous metaphysics it is an enrichment of metaphysics and a bringing of the fundamental thoughts of metaphysics to completion.
Heidegger then highlights the significance of Nietzsche's understanding of the beingness of being. He says that Nietzsche's interpretation of all metaphysics in terms of valuative thought is rooted:
"... in the basic definition of being as a whole as will to power. Neither Hegel nor Kant, neither Leibniz nor Descartes, neither Medieval nor Hellenistic thought, neither Aristotle nor Plato, neither Parmenides nor Heraclitus knew of will to power as the fundamental character of beings."
What then are we to make of Nietzsche's understanding of beingness?
If valuation is included in the will to power what of will to power itself? Where does it originate, given that it is the roots of the origin of value within metaphysics. Heidegger says that:
"..in order to make the proper contrast between the history of metaphysic as it must first be experienced and Nietzsche's conception of metaphysics, we must on the basis of what has already been said first place his interpretation of the history of metaphysics before us in a comprehensible form. Until now, we have learned that only that for Nietzsche valuations have their ground and necessity in the will to power."
If a definite will to power was involved in the first positing of the highest values hitherto at the beginning of metaphysics, then the values "purpose", "unity", "truth" etc have been falsely projected into the essence of things. How did that projection come to be? What configuration of will to power was at work here.
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