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September 29, 2004
Trevor,
in the light of your remarks in your Spazzing and philosophy post I came across this discussion of Benjamin and Adorno in the comments threads over at The Young Hegelian.
In this discussion about quotes and context someone called Anonymous writes:
"It is tempting to see Adorno's use of constellations as akin to Hegel's remarks on mediation in the Encylopedia logic (sec. 70) in that what both Hegel and Adorno seem to be doing is overcoming the one-sidedness of concepts by placing them in relation to other equally one-sided concepts. The point of this strategy, however, is to aim towards the particular itself (contra Benjamin). "
Anonymous then asks, 'At what point, then, do Hegel and Adorno seem to disagree?' Two differences are then noted:
"(1) For Adorno, Hegel does not "deal with the particular as a particular at all". Instead, "[h]is logic deals only with particularity, which is already conceptual" (ND 326). It is not, therefore, that Hegel sees the universal as above and beyond the particulars which constitute it but that he can't think beyond the "concept" of the particular and, thus, misses what the particular is - something which cannot be wholly conceptualised. Of course, it is ethically and politically important, for Adorno, that we register something which cannot be exhausted by thinking as a corrective to the excesses of enlightenment.
(2) Adorno thinks that, for Hegel, the procedure of determinate negation (by which the Adornian strategy of constructing constellations seems to be a more advanced variant) yields some sort of teleological path towards Truth whereas, for Adorno, it can only suggest or hint at the space for Utopia in the face of the bad. Constellations, therefore, only figure as a means of illuminating the possibility of the good and do not open up some “triumphal march of reason”.
Personally I do not buy the claim that Hegel sees history as the “triumphal march of reason”---that is not how the Phenomenology of Spirit reads-- but we can leave that aside for the moment.
In response the Young Hegelian says that Anonymous characterizes Adorno accurately on particulars and determinate negation. The Young Hegelian then says:
"Personally, I feel Hegel is right. We cannot know, grasp, name or even describe particulars without concepts, without universal terms (thus paras 100-110 of the Phenomenology on ‘sense-certainty’ where Hegel shows consciousness trying to grasp the haeccity of particulars and finding itself having to use the most general universals – ‘this’, ‘here’, ‘now’, etc.)."
That is my position too. Maybe that is why I'm having such a difficulty with Klossowsk's reading of Nietzsche. Yet I am sympathetic to Adorno's point about concepts not grasping all the richness of particularity. On this issue Anonymous makes a good point:
" One way of looking at the particular, in Adorno, is to identify it with the somatic. I take Adorno to be claiming that Enlightenment’s drive towards universalism, objectivism and instrumentalism damages out ability to respond to or “mimic” the suffering and distress of others. Enlightenment forges concepts into formal and immutable systems – unable to communicate reflexively with the particulars from which they are constructed. An important part of what is lost, or disavowed, in this process is the somatic response to objects (and other people) – which is integral to any understanding of cognition."
I agree. A lot of bodily response to the world we inhabit is not captured by concepts. It is a tacit bodily knowledge --trusting your gut- etc.--that is now generally covered by desire or impulses in Klossowski---but which has its roots in Hegel's Phenomenology. I'm at one with the Young Hegelian on this.
So where does that leave me?
I have to run. Go have a read of the discussion. It is well worth it. I'll come back to Klossowski on Nietzsche in my next post.
As an aside, what I'm trying to do is becoming clearer:undermine the traditional (& French) view that juxtapositions Hegel and Nietzsche as philosophical opposites. I'm trying to find a way to show, that contrary to this traditional view, there is actually considerable overlap between Hegel and Nietzsche.
As an example consider the relationship philosophy and culture. The historicist the idea is that philosophy--contrary to the Cartesian impulse to deny it--emerges out of a culture. At the same time, philosophy reflects on culture. Both Nietzsche and Hegel recognize the need to work out their philosophies within, and in response, to culture.
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Back in ancient times, when I was an undergrad, I read a book that contrasts Nietzsche and Hegel that might address some of your concerns. It is called "Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics" and was written by Stephen Houlgate back in the 1980's. It may be out of print. My recollection is that it is a bit critical of Nietzsche but offers a good comparison of the two thinkers on a wide array of issues.