This review of Heidegger's Zollikon seminars is interesting for two reasons. First it clearly states what Heidegger was doing with his destruction or overcoming of the metaphysical tradition. It says:
"Here we see Heidegger insisting once again, as he did in Being and Time, on the necessity of distinguishing an ontological analysis of Dasein, i.e., an analysis of its manner of being (disclosedness, openness, the clearing), from an ontic analysis, e.g., a causal analysis or an analysis that supposes a subject confronting an object. He also revisits his account of the historical reasons why contemporary thinkers fail to appreciate this necessity. In this connection Heidegger calls attention to the continued influence of Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle, much as he projected that he would do in the unfinished second part of Being and Time. ...In the seminars he also rehearses at length his earlier analyses of time and his criticisms of a natural, scientistic attitude that takes for granted that, at bottom, ’being’ means the same thing, whether the subject matter is the travel of photons, the life of a cockroach, or human existence."
Physicalism sucked, big time. To put it into Heideggerian terms we can talk in terms of a questioning of the Physicalist World Picture. Another pathway of recoil---from Whitehead to Heidegger to Merleau Ponty.
However, what is even more interesting in Daniel Dahlstrom's Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews of Heidegger's Zollikon Seminars is the issue of the body in being-in-the world.
I've always read Merleau Ponty as extracing a very good interpretation from the buried themes of Being and Time, and then a building on it to a conception of an embodied being-in-the-world. I've always found this to offer one of the most innovative ways of crawling out of the reductionist physicalist flybottle to a new and different space.
Heidegger appears to concur with this reading of Merleau Ponty's innovative creation of new philosophical concepts. Daniel Dahlstrom's review says:
"Probably the most important new topic discussed at length in the seminars is a particularly weak link in those earlier analyses and a theme that one might expect him to confront in this setting: the body. Taking his cues from difficulties surrounding talk of “psychosomatic” and “somapsychic” illnesses, Heidegger turns to the problem of the body (like Husserl, Leib in contrast to Körper), though he does so by way of reviewing the account of Dasein’s spatiality that he gave in Being and Time. Without mentioning Husserl’s or, more importantly, Merleau-Ponty’s comparable studies, Heidegger analyzes such themes as blushing, phantom limbs, attention, being in pain, grasping, sadness, and gesture, among others. The lack of reference to Merleau-Ponty seems particularly egregious, not only given his extensive treatment of these themes, but also given his insistence both on the motility of perception and on construing the body in terms of a Heideggerian notion of being-in-the-world, an insistence that in both cases is iterated by Heidegger in the seminars. Indeed, at one point – in what amounts to a paraphrase of Merleau-Ponty’s own formulation – Heidegger equates “being-in-the-world” with “bodily having a world.”